hybridvorti.blogg.se - Antetype pricing

#Antetype pricing how to#

#Antetype pricing how to#

See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.įor technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1145. You can help correct errors and omissions. 111(2), pages 105-130, March.Īll material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. " Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information,"

Ana Borges & João Correia-da-Silva & Didier Laussel, 2014.

International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. " Two-part tariffs with quality degradation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. " Price Discrimination with Demarketing," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) " Use and abuse of regulated prices in electricity markets: “How to regulate regulated prices?”,"

David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Carine Staropoli, 2020.

" Use and Abuse of Regulated Prices in Electricity Markets: "How to Regulate Regulated Prices?","

Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jérôme & Staropoli, Carine, 2019.

4(2), pages 115-138, June.įull references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS) Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol.

Ex Ante Pricing: Optional Calling Plans and Tapered Tariffs," Clay, Karen B & Sibley, David S & Srinagesh, Padmanabhan, 1992.Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. " Countervailing incentives in agency problems," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. " A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993.Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. " Option value, telecommunications demand, and policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. " Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination," Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1994.Welfare comparison of optional tariffs will be very sensitive to type distributions, how types enter demand specifications, and the relative variance of the type components.

The paper also shows that no results regarding social efficiency may be obtained in general. The paper studies whether the monopolist may profit from screening consumers according to different information sets, and it shows that expected profits are higher under an ex-post tariff if the variance of the ex-ante type distribution is large enough. In this model consumers' uncertainty is resolved in the interim, between the tariff choice and the usage decision, through changes in their types. These optimal outlay schedules illustrate how the tariff design is altered when there exists a time lag between tariff choice and consumption. Two particular solutions commonly used in telecommunications and other industries are fully characterized. This paper addresses the optimal design of optional nonlinear tariffs.